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Executive summary
European Commission president-designate Ursula von der Leyen has made climate 
change a top priority, promising to propose a European Green Deal that would make Europe 
climate neutral by 2050. Th e European Green Deal should be conceived as a reallocation 
mechanism, fostering investment shifts and labour substitution in key economic sectors, 
while supporting the most vulnerable segments of society throughout the decarbonisation 
process. Th e deal’s four pillars would be carbon pricing, sustainable investment, industrial 
policy and a just transition.
First: a meaningful carbon price should be established for all sectors, by strengthening 
the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and by pushing EU countries to increase the price for 
emissions not covered by the ETS. To ensure a robust mechanism against carbon leakage, a 
carbon border tax should be prepared. However, such a measure will be extremely politically 
challenging, and the EU’s future climate policy should not rely on its successful implementa-
tion. Other instruments should therefore be put in place fi rst, including subsidies for low-car-
bon exports and stricter environmental standards importers would have to comply with to 
access the EU market.
Second: the carbon price should be complemented by a sustainable investment strate-
gy that pushes companies to switch technologies and promotes behavioural change among 
citizens, off setting any rising costs they face because of higher carbon prices. Green invest-
ment should be promoted by shifting current EU funds towards this purpose while enabling 
EU countries to support green investment, and by incentivising private investment through 
regulatory measures and through support for European promotional banks.
Third: European industry should be strengthened through support for disruptive green 
innovation; by creating the conditions for innovative, green, European companies to fl ourish 
(for example through new product standards and via carbon-based contracts for diff erence 
to ensure competition between companies for the most effi  cient technologies); and through 
measures to export the European Green Deal on the back of a reform of EU neighbourhood 
and development policy.
Fourth: the adverse social consequences of climate policies should be taken into ac-
count and minimised in each European climate policy proposal. Unavoidable impacts should 
be addressed by targeted compensation measures. Th e scope of the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund can be broadened and the mechanism adjusted to aid the transition in 
coal-mining regions.
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1 The contours of the European Green Deal
Th e European Union has stated repeatedly its aim to be at the forefront of global action 
against climate change. Th e EU has adopted policies to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
and support energy from clean sources, while being active in international climate negotia-
tions. However, the EU has not managed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions convincingly, 
and has not done enough to tackle emissions in some sectors. In transport, greenhouse gas 
emissions are rising, while in electricity systems coal continues to play a persistent role. Ener-
gy effi  ciency improvements in buildings have been unsatisfactory and the decarbonisation of 
industry has proved diffi  cult. Meanwhile, climate policy has become one of the most divisive 
EU topics. Th e FridaysForFuture movement has mobilised mainly young people to demand 
stronger climate policies. In contrast, there has been a backlash against fossil-fuel price in-
creases perceived as unfair, as seen with the gilets jaunes movement in France and beyond.
In this context, European Commission president-designate Ursula von der Leyen has 
promised to broaden and strengthen EU climate policy (von der Leyen, 2019). She intends 
to propose a European Climate Law that would require the EU to become climate neutral 
by 2050 – likely making Europe the fi rst continent to do so. To reach this ambitious goal, a 
comprehensive policy framework is required, encompassing the climate, energy, environ-
mental, industrial, economic and social aspects of this unprecedented process. Th is is what 
the European Green Deal is all about.
Von der Leyen has put forward a broad concept of the European Green Deal, sketching out 
about 20 diff erent proposals. Th ey include an increase in the EU’s 2030 emissions reduction 
target from 40 to 55 percent, the introduction of a carbon border tax, the drafting of a Sustain-
able Europe Investment Plan, the partial transformation of the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) into a climate bank, the extension of the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and the 
development of a new industrial policy for Europe ( von der Leyen, 2019). Th ese proposals are 
preliminary and, at the time of writing, are still in the form of general policy guidelines. Von 
der Leyen has said she will come up with a detailed policy plan within the fi rst 100 days of her 
mandate. So, while we have some general contours, the European Green Deal remains to be 
structured.
Th is Policy Contribution seeks to contribute to the design of the European Green Deal by 
outlining a realisable plan focused on what can be considered its four foundational pillars: 
carbon pricing, sustainable investment, industrial policy and a just transition.
2 How to price greenhouse gas emissions 
well
Putting a price on all emissions is essential because it incentivises all relevant parties to 
reduce their greenhouse gas footprints. Without such a price, other climate policy measures – 
such as subsidies or standards – cannot eff ectively reduce emissions1. Th e new Commission is 
therefore right to strive for a sensible price on all greenhouse gas emissions. A major reform of 
emission pricing in Europe will have to address three questions of principle:
1 Without a carbon price, falling fossil-fuel prices might make it attractive to use fossil fuels in unregulated sectors, 
while greater effi  ciency of devices might encourage increased usage (rebound eff ect).
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A single price or diff erentiation between sectors/countries?
A key question when pricing greenhouse gas emissions is whether each unit of emissions 
(typically expressed as the greenhouse gas equivalent of one tonne of carbon dioxide) should 
have the same price, or whether prices in diff erent sectors and/or diff erent countries should 
be allowed to vary. Currently, Europe has a hybrid system. Greenhouse gas emissions from 
large industrial emitters (including power generators) that fall under the EU ETS have a single 
price throughout Europe, while other emissions, such as from heating or road transport, are 
not explicitly priced.
Textbook economics would suggest putting the same price on all emissions. Th is would 
incentivise economic actors to reduce all emissions that can be mitigated at a cost below this 
emission price and would avoid ineffi  cient circumvention (such as consumers preferring to 
use natural gas that is not covered by the current emission pricing system, instead of electric-
ity which is). Consequently, harmonising emission prices across sectors reduces the total cost 
of emissions reduction2. 
But while a single carbon price for all sectors and countries is economically effi  cient, it 
implies substantial distributional eff ects. Two examples:
1. To decarbonise transport – which is essential to achieve a carbon-neutral continent – 
much higher carbon prices would be needed than the carbon price required to decarbon-
ise most electricity production. Electricity prices will be determined by the most expen-
sive unit that is needed to meet the demand – which will still often be a fossil-fuelled 
power plant (even though the bulk of electricity is produced carbon-free) – and might 
thus drastically increase without much impact on power-sector emissions. Th is will have 
massive distributional consequences as all electricity consumers will have to pay these 
higher prices.
2. A single carbon price will aff ect more poorer EU countries, which typically have higher 
emissions per unit of GDP. Th erefore, in sectors with emissions that are not very sensitive 
to expected carbon prices3, keeping carbon prices lower might reduce undesirable distrib-
utive eff ects little impact on emissions.
For effi  ciency reasons, the European Commission should strive to converge towards a 
single carbon price over time. Heating and transport emissions should be priced to provide 
economic actors with incentives to change their consumption behaviour and/or invest in 
cleaner technologies. And emissions in sectors with high levels of trade across EU country 
borders (eg electricity and industry) should have the same price in each country to avoid 
distorting the single market4. But giving EU countries some fl exibility to set prices for emis-
sions that are price insensitive but have signifi cant distributional consequences might have 
limited cost in terms of effi  ciency but high political value. Th e right tool would be a signifi cant 
and rising European minimum tax rate on emissions, which those countries that want to cut 
emissions faster5 can exceed if they want.
Tax or trading permits?
Th ere are two main instruments for putting a price on emissions. Either the government fi xes 
a price – a tax – or the government issues a fi xed volume of emission allowances and leaves 
the market to determine a price for these allowances. Economists have a slight preference for 
taxation because there is less risk of getting the price wrong than of getting the volume wrong. 
2 Th is is becoming more important as electrifi cation is seen as a main avenue for decarbonisation. When fossil fuels 
in heating, cooling, mobility and other energy services compete with electricity, they should not be subject to (too) 
diff erent carbon prices.
3 Th at is, when the level of the carbon price is very far from the marginal abatement cost in this sector.
4 Th is should also include the harmonisation/cancellation of existing national compensation schemes for indirect 
emission costs in the EU ETS.
5 For example, those EU countries that have above-average ‘eff ort sharing’ targets for 2030.
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But in practice, policymakers try to guide both the price and the volume by adjusting either if 
the system does not provide the expected results. Consequently, mixed systems (where some 
emissions are covered by carbon trading and others by taxes) and/or hybrid systems (where 
prices in trading systems are managed) are the norm rather than the exception.
Th e EU has a mixed system with half of the emissions falling under the EU ETS, and the 
other half being only partially covered by national taxes6. Th e EU ETS is also a hybrid system 
because the system is regularly adjusted to deliver ‘sensible’ prices7.
Th e European Green Deal can retain the current mixed and hybrid system. But it should 
include proposals to push EU countries to put the right prices on emissions in some of the 
areas not covered by EU ETS: transport, heating and maybe agriculture. Th e right approach 
would be to revise the 2003 Energy Taxation Directive (2003/96/EC), which sets minimum 
tax rates for fuels. A European agreement on minimum carbon prices in the non-ETS sectors 
would allow national governments to establish national carbon-pricing rules within their 
national fi scal systems, while reducing concerns about intra-EU carbon leakage. It will still 
be diffi  cult to defi ne a minimum tax rate that is equally acceptable to the poorest and richest 
countries. But as the fi scal revenues accrue at the national level, these revenues in principle 
allow each country to target compensation at the most aff ected national consumers. 
Th e EU ETS can also be strengthened by providing investors with some clearer guidance 
on future prices. Our suggestion would be to give the European Investment Bank a mandate 
to sell guarantees that protect investors against low carbon prices in the future. Th is would 
create a liability for future governments in case of carbon prices that are too low8.
What to do with the revenues
Emissions pricing in the EU can bring substantial revenues. Putting a price of €40/tonne9 on 
all EU emissions (around 4.5 billion tonnes annually) would lead to €180 billion in revenues – 
signifi cantly more than the current revenues from the EU ETS (around €25 billion10).
Th e fi rst issue is how much of this money would accrue at the European level and how 
much at national level. Th is is a largely political question. While it might be more effi  cient 
to have more revenues available in the centre to enable compromises in diffi  cult issues, EU 
countries in the past only allowed the European Commission to set up two relatively small 
centralised funds (see section 4). Th e second question is what to use these revenues for. Th ey 
can be used for the general budget, returned to consumers to mitigate distributional eff ects 
(see section 5), used to support the development of low-carbon alternatives, public invest-
ment in low-carbon infrastructure, or given to companies to compensate them for compet-
itive disadvantage arising from stronger climate policies. Getting this balance right will be 
6 Th ere is a complex national patchwork of explicit or implicit taxation of fossil fuel use in transport and heating 
(Kettner-Marx and Kletsen-Slamanig, 2018).
7 A surplus of emission allowances has built up in the ETS since 2009, as a consequence of the economic crisis and 
high imports of international credits. Th is led to low carbon prices. Th is problem was addressed by introducing 
in January 2019 a market stability reserve: a system under which 900 million allowances are transferring into a 
reserve rather than auctioned. As a consequence of this intervention, the price of emission allowances quickly 
increased from below €10 in early 2018 to about €25 per tonne of CO2 at the time of writing.
8 For more details on such guarantees, see Zachmann (2013).
9 Th ere is no European Commission modelling on what carbon price would be needed to achieve 50-55 percent 
decarbonisation by 2030. Existing modelling for policies that imply a 45 percent emissions cut by 2030 compared 
to 1990 indicate a carbon price of at least €28. But targeting to go from 4300 million tons of CO2 equivalent of 
greenhouse gases (mt) in 2020 to 2600 mt (a 55 percent reduction compared to 1990) instead of 3100 mt (minus 45 
percent compared to 1990) implies an almost 50 percent increase in mitigation (from 1200 mt to 1700 mt), which 
arguably comes at strongly increasing marginal cost. See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/fi les/technical_
note_on_the_euco3232_fi nal_14062019.pdf.
10 Th e EU ETS covers less than half of all emissions. Only about 60 percent of the allowances are auctioned, and the 
price at time of writing is around €25.
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crucial for the political viability of any emissions pricing system11.
Currently, most ETS revenue is given to national governments, which are bound by a 
relatively weakly monitored commitment to spend half of the money for climate and energy 
purposes. For the years 2021-30 two special European funds have been set up to centrally 
support innovation (Innovation fund: €20 billion) and lower-income EU countries (moderni-
sation fund: 2 percent of issued allowances).
We would advise against using additional emissions pricing revenues in the general 
budgets of EU countries, and would suggest instead to use additional funds to support the 
development of the low-carbon economy through public funding of research, development 
and innovation, support for private investment in low-carbon alternatives, and compensation 
for the most-aff ected households that must increase their carbon-related spending (heating, 
electricity).
Dealing with leakage
If Europe puts in place a stringent climate policy while other parts of the world do not, there 
is a risk that emissions-intensive companies might leave the EU with its high emission prices, 
and relocate to places with signifi cantly lower or no emission prices. Th is is called carbon 
leakage. Th is issue is set to become more relevant with the EU pursuing a more ambitious 
climate policy, but we do not know the exact order of magnitude of the issue (PMR, 2015). 
Studies show that carbon leakage has not represented a substantial issue for EU industry 
under the ETS (Branger et al, 2017; Ferguson and Sanctuary, 2019; Zachmann et al, 2011). It is 
also important to consider that the carbon price represents one element among many others 
in an industrial strategy. Other considerations include energy prices, logistics, territorial lega-
cy and innovation ecosystems.
Currently, carbon leakage is dealt with by giving emission allowances for free to compa-
nies in specifi c sectors. Th e allocation mechanism for free allowances is based on produc-
tion benchmarks to ensure that companies have an incentive to reduce emissions but not 
to reduce production in the EU. But the mechanism has led to massive windfall profi ts for 
companies (they received allowances for free but included the cost of emissions in the price 
of their products). It is not desirable to continue with this method to deal with carbon leakage.
Part of the European Green Deal, according to von der Leyen, would be an alternative 
system: a carbon border tax (CBT). Th is has two aims: i) preventing carbon leakage by 
ensuring that all goods consumed in the EU, whether imported or produced domestically, are 
treated the same; ii) pushing other countries across the world to also decarbonise. Th is would 
be achieved by putting a tax or tariff  on the emissions embedded in imported products. In 
addition, EU exporters might reclaim the cost of the emissions embedded in their products to 
ensure that European companies are not at a competitive disadvantage when selling abroad.
In reality, calculating the emissions content of imports is feasible12 but diffi  cult, as all 
emissions along the entire value chain would need to be considered. Even more challenging 
would be the risk of potential retaliation from trade partners. Von der Leyen already made 
clear that a CBT should be compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
to ensure that countries cannot retaliate based on WTO rules. But even if the CBT is safe-
guarded against formal objections, trade partners might still perceive a CBT as overreach 
and threaten/implement retaliatory measures (such as, for example, when the EU tried to 
11 By defi nition, carbon tax revenues would go into the general budget. But implicit linkage to expenditure is a 
common practice when introducing new taxes. For revenues from the ETS, the EU and member states would be 
relatively free to dedicate it to specifi c purposes.
12 Th e EU could use standardised norms such as ISO 14067 that have been created to measure the carbon footprint of 
products (for details, see https://www.iso.org/obp/ui#iso:std:iso:14067:ed-1:v1:en).
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introduce a unilateral carbon price on intercontinental fl ights)13. Th e ongoing fi erce debate 
between proponents and opponents of such a tax14 show that achieving a meaningful border 
tax will require the expenditure of a great deal of political capital in Brussels and the national 
capitals. Th ere is a risk that discussing a complex solution to a potential problem will distract 
attention from more urgent issues and result in a weak compromise.
Any CBT proposal will be extremely politically challenging, and the EU’s future climate 
policy should not rely on its successful implementation. Th is is particularly because the scale 
of the carbon leakage problem remains unknown. 
Th erefore, the EU should follow a trial-and-error approach, with the fi rst priority being 
to do what is necessary to ensure an appropriate price on all greenhouse gas emissions in 
Europe. As far as the leakage risk is concerned, the EU should help domestic producers 
of steel, cement and chemicals (eg the products most aff ected by higher carbon prices) 
to become cleaner – as it did in the past with renewable energy subsidies for the electric-
ity sector. Companies that produce internationally traded goods with signifi cantly lower 
emissions than the average could be granted subsidies linked to the reduced emissions. Th e 
value of these subsidies per tonne of mitigated emissions might be signifi cantly higher than 
the carbon price as long as the new technologies are not mature. Th is could help to build the 
competitive advantage of European industry for the global low-carbon economy (see section 
5). In addition, carbon rebates for exports (ie companies can reclaim the carbon price embed-
ded in export products) can be applied, combined with a support scheme for low-carbon 
production of otherwise emissions-intensive products.
As far as the second aim of pushing other countries across the world towards decarbon-
isation is concerned, the EU should make better use of environmental standards. Requiring 
compliance with strict environmental regulations a condition of access to the EU market of 
500 million people should be a strong incentive to all other countries to adapt and change 
their production processes.
In parallel, the European Commission should work on a WTO-compatible and acceptable 
CBT, but should hold off  from implementing it15. Th e Commission should closely monitor the 
evolution of carbon leakage risks in Europe, and ultimately implement a CBT if the risks start 
to materialise.
3 Mobilising investment for the transition
How large is the ‘green investment gap’? 
Most estimates of the yearly average additional investment (public and private) necessary to 
achieve the EU’s current 2030 climate and energy targets are in the range of €175 billion to 
€290 billion16. Th e European Commission’s most recent estimate (European Commission, 
2019a) of this ‘green investment gap’, taking into account the currently agreed target17, is €260 
billion per year. According to this estimate, the investment needs per sector would be: €125 
13 In 2012 the EU tried to make intercontinental fl ights leaving from or arriving in the EU buy emission allowances 
for the whole emissions of each fl ight. It was seen as a relatively simple case. Nevertheless, WTO compliance of the 
scheme was challenged and fi erce opposition from the US and China (which threatened to retaliate by no longer 
buying Airbuses) killed the project politically.
14 See, for example, Horn and Sapir (2019) and Wolff  (2019).
15 Our proposals would actually give time to the European Commission to prepare a ready-made solution for a CBT if 
it is needed in the future.
16 See for instance European Commission (2018a).
17 However, this estimate corresponds to a -40 percent emission reduction target, not to the more ambitious -55 
percent proposed by Ursula von der Leyen. As abatement costs are typically non-linear, the green investment gap 
to reach that target could even be larger.
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billion for the residential sector, €71 billion for the service sector, €21 billion for the transport 
sector, €21 billion for power generation, €13 billion for the power grid, €4 billion for the indus-
try sector, and €2 billion for boilers. 
Whatever the exact aggregate number for the ‘green investment gap’, it is important to 
note that the models used in these estimations tend to underestimate investment that will 
be needed for the low-carbon transition18. In addition, the success of technologies in the 
long run is highly uncertain. As a result, it might be preferable to over-invest in green R&D in 
the short-term to insure against potentially catastrophic events in the future. Also, scenarios 
involving less behavioural change on the part of citizens are generally the most expensive in 
terms of investment. Th is means that if Europeans want to preserve their current way of life as 
much as possible they need to invest even more today. All in all, despite the high uncertainty 
surrounding these estimates, the desirable number for additional investment is probably 
nearer to the €250-300 billion per year range19. In this context, the Sustainable Europe Invest-
ment Plan mentioned by Ursula von der Leyen in her political guidelines and in her fi rst 
speech (16 July 2019) to the European Parliament only envisages a €100 billion per year target.
What would be the macro consequences of the Green Deal? Despite the potentially signifi -
cant size of the plan (and despite being a good selling point for the European Green Deal), the 
possibility of obtaining a so-called double dividend – both a positive environmental eff ect and 
a positive macroeconomic eff ect – seems to be overstated. Even if the potential crowding-out 
eff ect of the investment pillar of the European Green Deal appears to be very low, especially 
in today’s low interest rate environment, the aggregate macroeconomic eff ect of the transi-
tion, and of the investment plan to support it, is overall expected to be relatively modest20 
(around +0.1 percent of annual GDP growth according the literature review conducted by 
Gueret et al, 2019)21. Besides, the overarching objective of the Green Deal should not be to 
boost growth22 but to facilitate the necessary reallocation of capital in and across sectors in 
order to decarbonise, and to mitigate the resulting reallocation in employment (which is 
discussed in more detail in section 5).
Having said that, even if the overall impact on growth is expected to be small over the 
whole period, a potential co-benefi t from a macro perspective of having a 10-year investment 
plan ready would be to have a list of concrete off -the-shelf investment projects that can be 
rolled out more quickly if they are needed from a countercyclical perspective (which might 
come in handy quickly given the slowdown currently experienced by the European econ-
omy). Th is would boost the total macroeconomic eff ect of the plan, given that multipliers 
have been higher during recessions.  
In terms of timing, political economy considerations dictate clear sequencing: green 
investments need to be made as soon as possible, before carbon prices rise to a high level, so 
households and companies can switch smoothly to green alternatives when this happens. Th e 
green investment push thus needs to start now. Th e temptation to procrastinate and to leave 
the burden of reaching the 2030 targets to the 2024-2029 Commission should be avoided.
18 For instance, the PRIMES model used by the European Commission “does not include investment in roads, 
railways, ports and airports infrastructure and in systems facilitating sharing of vehicles etc., as these are out of 
the scope of the model. Investment or hidden costs related to behavioural or organisation structural changes or in 
sectors outside energy are not part of the calculation of investment expenditures either. Generally, the model does not 
include the full investment expenditure of industrial plants and buildings, but only the parts that relate to energy 
and effi  ciency and to a certain extent to the additional investment expenditure to change process technology in the 
industry” (European Commission, 2018b, p330).
19 Th is number increases further if the international climate fi nance promises of developed countries from the 2015 
Paris Agreement are added ($100 billion per year).
20 Th is is probably the case because the models used assume a low multiplier on average over the next decade.
21 Th is does not take into account, however, that averting climate change soon enough would lead to the avoidance 
of (hardly quantifi able) costs related to health care, climate-related damage, the loss of value of stranded assets, 
migration, and to compensation for distributional eff ects.
22 Actually, boosting growth signifi cantly could make the climate targets harder to achieve, unless a full decoupling 
of economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions is achieved thanks to technological progress.
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Th e EU has very limited resources to conduct its own investments. Its main role in plug-
ging the green investment gap will thus be to design an investment plan that will: 1) mobilise 
public funds through the EU budget and member states’ national budgets and through the 
European Investment Bank in order to take advantage of the historically low interest rates 
from which European governments and institutions currently benefi t, and 2) incentivise the 
private sector to invest in the transition.
How can the Commission boost public investment for the transition? 
Public investment will be needed because of the public-good nature of some the investments. 
Th is will be particularly the case for deployment of a sustainable transportation system, which 
will involve, fi rst, helping owners of old polluting vehicles to replace them by more environ-
mental-friendly vehicles, and, more importantly, developing alternatives to car ownership. 
Th is implies renovating the railway network or building bicycle facilities. Another important 
role for the public sector will be to renovate public buildings and social housing to make them 
energy effi  cient. Finally, public authorities will also have to invest in R&D in new technolo-
gies, especially carbon capture and storage. More generally, direct public investment is also 
important for increasing the long-term credibility of other climate-mitigation instruments 
and to reduce the potential regulatory risk perceived by private investors. From an incentive 
perspective, it is important also that governments should bear some of the losses in case of 
failure resulting from a change in environmental regulation to convince investors the regula-
tion is defi nitive.
Th e role of the Commission will be twofold: greening the EU’s own investments, and 
encouraging EU countries green their public investments.
Greening the EU’s own investments
At the European level, the main tool to invest directly will remain the EU budget. Th e Europe-
an Commission (2018c) has already proposed to increase the share of EU spending that con-
tributes to the EU’s climate objectives from 20 percent in the 2014-20 Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) to at least 25 percent in the next MFF (ie from about €30 billion to about 
€45 billion per year over 7 years). Th is is a good fi rst step, but there are two important caveats. 
First, given the total size of the EU budget (around 1 percent of GDP), it will always remain 
a marginal source of green investment compared to the overall needs. But even if the overall 
eff ect is small, the share of cohesion policy funding in public investment per EU country is 
very variable (from zero in Luxembourg to 84 percent in Portugal23), which means that a shift 
towards green investment in the EU budget could still play a catalyst role in some countries in 
which cohesion funds play a signifi cant role.
Second, increasing the target goes in the right direction, but for the EU budget to be 
signifi cant in fi lling the green investment gap, it is also crucial to review how EU expenditures 
are accounted for as contributing to the fi ght against climate change. Th e current method-
ology tends to overestimate substantially the contribution of the EU budget, in particular 
of agricultural funds (European Court of Auditors, 2016). Each expenditure item is given a 
climate coeffi  cient of 0 percent, 40 percent or 100 percent depending on its contribution to 
climate change mitigation or adaptation. Th is method has the advantage of being simple and 
pragmatic, but can be highly misleading: for instance, expenditure that leads to an increase 
in emissions does not have a negative coeffi  cient for negative impact. A more demanding but 
much more accurate methodology that would try to estimate carbon content of each action 
would help make the EU budget genuinely greener.
Encouraging and enabling green public investment by EU countries
Despite the EU budget’s signifi cant role in some countries, most public investment is still car-
ried out at the national level in the EU. As a result, the strategic goals and the funds allocated 
23 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/Other/-of-cohesion-policy-funding-in-public-investment-p/7bw6-2dw3.
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to them are in the hands of national governments and not under the control of the EU. If the 
European Commission wants to foster investment to accelerate the transition, it must fi nd a 
way to encourage public investment in member states and then use indirect measures to steer 
it so it contributes to the climate objective. For this, the Commission has two main tools at its 
disposal.
Th e fi rst is the country-specifi c recommendations made under the European Semester, 
which have recently highlighted the need for investment in some particular sectors at the 
local level to fulfi l common objectives, including the fi ght against climate change (European 
Commission, 2019b). Even though EU countries have often not followed through on the coun-
try-specifi c recommendations in recent years (Efstathiou and Wolff , 2018), this represents at 
least a welcome fi rst attempt to coordinate investment across member states around some 
European priorities.
Th e second, and probably more infl uential, tool for the EU to steer investment is the 
European fi scal framework. In general, fi scal rules should be reformed to deter countries from 
slashing public investment when they consolidate their public fi nances, and to ensure that 
they are able to take advantage of favourable interest rates to invest in public goods. One way 
to do that would be to include some form of golden rule in the European fi scal framework to 
allow the fi nancing of investments through the issuing of debt. At the very least, as proposed 
by Claeys et al (2016), public investment could be accounted for in the same way that corpo-
rate investment is accounted for: its costs could be distributed over the whole service life of 
the investment, rather than smoothed over four years, as is the case now.
If an agreement cannot be found to reform thoroughly the fi scal rules to make them more 
investment-friendly in general, a reform focused on authorising defi cit-fi nanced green invest-
ment during the transition should be pursued as part of the European Green Deal. One way 
to put in place a form of ‘green golden rule’ would be to revise the investment clause of the 
European fi scal framework to make it much more fl exible in order to exempt from the fi scal 
rules public investment that mitigates or adapts to climate change.
In fact, the current clause already allows for deviation from the structural balance medi-
um-term objective to fi nance investments “with positive, direct and verifi able long-term 
eff ects on growth and on the sustainability of public fi nances”. Given the potentially high risk 
in the long run of climate change for public fi nances, it would not be a stretch to apply the 
clause to green investment. However, other refi nements would be necessary to transform the 
clause from a temporary exemption that can only be used in bad times24 to a more permanent 
exemption for green investment from the rules, even in good times.
To avoid any abuse of such a green investment clause by EU countries that might be 
tempted to apply the exemption to their current expenditures, two safeguards could be intro-
duced. First, the maximum amount of green investment exempted could be related to the 
level of the green investment gap in each country, which would be determined each year as 
part of the European Semester. Second, clear accounting rules would be needed to separate 
investment in the low-carbon transition from other expenditures. Th is could be facilitated by 
the introduction of an ambitious taxonomy for sustainable fi nance25 and clear rules concern-
ing the issuance of green bonds. Well-defi ned green investments fi nanced through the issu-
ance of green bonds could thus be clearly separated from the rest of the budget and exempted 
from the rules.
24 Today, the investment clause is subject to the following conditions: that the member state’s GDP growth is forecast 
to be negative or to remain well below its potential (resulting in negative output gap greater than 1.5 percent of 
potential GDP) and that the member state remains in the preventive arm and that an appropriate safety margin 
with respect to the 3 percent of GDP defi cit reference value is preserved (European Commission, 2019c). As a result 
of these restrictive conditions, only two countries, Italy and Finland, have so far applied to the use the investment 
clause. 
25 Such a taxonomy is at time of writing under discussion; see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/
banking-and-fi nance/green-fi nance_en.
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How can the Commission encourage private investment in the transition?
Corporations and households will be responsible for the vast majority of investment needed 
for the transition26, as the sectoral distribution of investment needs also suggests. Private in-
vestment will drive the electrifi cation and improved energy effi  ciency of the privately-owned 
segment of the residential sector, and of the service and industry sectors. Private investment 
will also represent most of the investment in the transport sector given that replacement of 
private vehicles will be covered by households. In the energy sector, investment in renewa-
ble power generation or electricity storage will mainly be fi nanced by the private sector. Th e 
Commission thus needs to fi nd a way to mobilise signifi cant resources from the private sector 
and redirect fi nancing from brown towards green activities to fi ll the green investment gap. 
Th e role of the Commission will be twofold: to create a conducive regulatory framework, and 
to improve the fi nancing conditions for green investment.
Creating a conducive regulatory framework
Th e most important tool to push companies and households away from brown activities will 
be a high carbon price (see section 2). Another important step will be to put in place as soon 
as possible an ambitious investment taxonomy that will make brown activities unattractive to 
investors.
But these tools will not be enough to encourage the effi  cient deployment of immature 
low-carbon technologies, which are confronted with several market failures. Private deploy-
ment of low-carbon technologies will help to bring down the cost of these technologies (as 
was the case for photovoltaic, wind, batteries and electric vehicles) and will therefore enable 
large-scale take-up in the EU and beyond.
Hence, public support instruments beyond carbon pricing will be crucial for an effi  cient 
decarbonisation pathway. Particularly important will be public support for private R&D 
investment, pilot projects and fi rst deployment. Much of the monetary incentives will have 
to come from the member states. But the Commission must enable and encourage such 
incentives by allowing EU countries (especially in terms of state aid rules) to experiment with 
support programmes. 
Improving the ﬁ nancing conditions for green private investment
Many green technologies are more capital intensive than brown technologies. Consequently, 
fi nancing conditions play an important role in the technology choices of economic actors. In 
other words, there are many sectors in which, depending on the interest rate and on their ac-
cess to fi nance, households and companies can choose either green (for example an electric 
vehicle with a high capital cost but lower fuel costs) or brown (for example a conventional car 
with a lower upfront cost but higher fuel costs)27.
Direct support for private investment is thus complementary to the price and regulatory 
incentives needed to solve market failures. In particular, it is crucial to provide assistance to 
valuable projects that face fi nancing constraints because their social desirability arises from 
positive externalities that are not internalised by private investors or manifests itself beyond 
the maturity of traditional fi nancial instruments – scenarios that are particularly the case for 
green investment. Th e best instrument for this would be to use more actively public develop-
ment banks – the EIB and national public fi nance institutions – to fi nance the transition.
On that front, the Commission’s main tool to crowd-in private investment will remain 
InvestEU, the upgraded version of the Juncker Plan, which at time of writing is planned to 
continue to be part of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027. 
Th e Juncker Plan was originally intended as a short-term demand stimulus to substantially 
26 Overall, it is useful to remember as an order of magnitude that public investment represents around 3 percent of 
EU GDP, while private investment represents 17 percent of EU GDP in 2019 (AMECO). 
27 Th e current low interest rates are thus good news for low-carbon technologies but there is no guarantee that inter-
est rates will remain as low as now throughout the whole transition.
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leverage the Commission’s limited resources through private investment. Th e European Fund 
for Strategic Investments (EFSI) – the formal name of the main instrument of the Juncker 
Plan – received a €16 billion guarantee from the EU budget and €5 billion of the EIB’s own 
resources to enable the EIB Group to invest in riskier projects that have diffi  culty fi nding 
other sources of fi nancing, and to reduce the potential crowding-out eff ect, without risking 
its AAA rating. Th is was supposed to generate at least €315 billion of additional investment 
before mid-2018 by crowding-in private investors. EFSI was extended in 2017 until 2020 and 
the guarantee increased to €33.5 billion (€26 billion from the EU guarantee and €7.5 billion 
from the EIB) with the goal of mobilising €500 billion in additional investment by 2020. For 
2021-2027, the proposed size of the InvestEU guarantee is €38 billion, which is expected to 
mobilise €650 billion in investment, with 30 percent of this overall budget contributing to 
climate objectives. 
It is diffi  cult to assess if the Juncker Plan has achieved its goal and contributed signifi cantly 
to an increase in investment in Europe, but the European Court of Auditors (2019) and Claeys 
and Leandro (2016) were sceptical about the additionality of investments decided under the 
plan. According to the European Court of Auditors (2019), at least one third of the projects 
were not additional, ie they could have been executed without EFSI, either by the EIB without 
EU budget support, or via alternative private fi nancing sources. Another issue with the plan is 
the slow disbursement of the funds. According to the EIB’s own model (EIB, 2018), the peak 
impact of the plan will be in 2020-2021, six years after its design and 12 years after the begin-
ning of the crisis. Th e Juncker Plan could not function as a stimulus tool. 
However, despite its fl aws as a stimulus plan, the Juncker Plan was a smart attempt to lev-
erage the very limited EU resources using private capital markets. Moreover, improvements 
were made when the plan was renewed in 2017, and others improvements are envisaged as 
part of the InvestEU proposal. Th e new approach is to put less emphasis on volume and more 
emphasis on investing in the EU’s top priorities, in particular fi ghting climate change. How-
ever, to ensure InvestEU succeeds, additional changes to the programme and its governance 
should be made. In particular, the additionality criteria in the choice of projects that can 
benefi t from the EU guarantee should be improved. To ensure that these projects are addi-
tional, they need to be diff erent to the usual EIB projects, otherwise the green investment gap 
will not be reduced. Th e EIB’s internal rating currently plays an important role in determining 
whether projects can be submitted to the independent committee in charge of granting the 
EFSI label. However, the ratings themselves are provided by the EIB team, creating a risk that 
the EIB has an incentive to under-rate projects to make them eligible for the EU guarantee 
and to reduce its own risks. As a safeguard against this, the rating could be delegated to an 
independent team. Other changes could also be considered to ensure that fi nanced projects 
are diff erent from traditional EIB projects, such as the systematic use of subordinated instru-
ments or of instruments with longer maturities. Furthermore, to be truly additional, InvestEU 
should focus on projects that really lack fi nancing options. 
In addition, for InvestEU to become the main fi nancial vehicle of the European Green 
Deal, the guidelines need to be much stricter in terms of sustainability. For instance, almost 
three quarters of the projects supported by EFSI in the transport sector in the fi rst three years 
of the programme were high-carbon projects, and EFSI still supports fossil-fuel projects in the 
energy sector (Roggenbuck and Sol, 2019). Th e selection of projects thus needs to be much 
stricter and in line with climate goals.
A more radical approach could be for the Commission to push for the reform of the 
European Investment Bank in order to adapt its mission and transform it into the EU’s climate 
bank. In her political guidelines, von der Leyen said she wanted to increase the share of total 
EIB fi nancing dedicated to climate investment from 25 percent to 50 percent by 2025. To do 
this, the Commission must convince the EIB board of governors – the fi nance ministers of EU 
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countries – to change how the EIB functions and the projects it invests in28. 
If the Commission wants the EIB to contribute to fi lling the green investment gap, it must 
avoid duplication of investment already committed under national budgets or EU Structural 
Funds, or that could be fi nanced by the private sector. Instead, to best use limited EU funds, 
the EIB should be refocused on fi nancing investments that are strategic, in particular in the 
energy transition.
In addition, the EIB – even without the EU budget guarantee for EFSI – should be able 
to do more to fi nance the transition. Its volume of new lending disbursed has gone down 
every year since 2015, and its total outstanding amount of loans has fallen as well. Th e EIB 
has clearly some margin of manoeuvre to act more forcefully: its capital ratio has gone up in 
recent years, its leverage has been going down since 2012, and according to its statutes (article 
16.5), it can lend as much as two and a half times its level of subscribed capital, plus reserves 
and profi ts, which means its portfolio of loans could reach around €600 billion, compared to 
about €450 billion today. Th e EIB currently benefi ts from very favourable rates for its bor-
rowing from capital markets29 and it would be a shame not to use this opportunity to fi nance 
worthwhile projects that can contribute to the fi ght against climate change.
If EU countries are (unduly) afraid for the EIB’s rating, the Commission should propose 
a new capital increase, similar to that which was done at the beginning of 2013 to increase 
the EIB’s fi repower to fulfi l its enhanced mission as the EU’s climate bank. An additional 
important part of transforming the EIB into the EU’s climate bank is scaling-up its technical 
assistance activities, which are important for supporting local governments across Europe in 
developing (ie procuring) and structuring clean energy projects.
4 An industrial policy for the European 
Green Deal
To be politically and socially accepted and supported, the European Green Deal must make 
decarbonisation into an opportunity to revitalise European industry, and thus to ensure long-
term economic growth and jobs. Th at is, while heading towards climate neutrality by 2050, the 
European economy has to remain highly competitive at global level, in the context of increas-
ing competition from China and other big players. While EU countries implement their own 
industrial policies, it is important to also have a broader EU-level industrial policy, in order to 
prevent market distortions and to allow synergies and economies of scale.
An EU industrial policy for the European Green Deal should be structured according to a 
three concentric circles strategy.
Circle 1: Foster disruptive innovation
Innovation is the driving force for decarbonisation, and will be at the core of the decarbonisa-
tion of industry. To achieve climate neutrality while leading global decarbonisation from an 
industrial standpoint, Europe must become a global innovation powerhouse for clean energy, 
clean mobility and smart buildings technologies. To do so, Europe must invest more in R&D, 
and must invest better.
28 Th e EIB has proposed to its member to stop lending to fossil fuel projects by 2020, but this crucial move is currently 
blocked by some countries which still want gas projects to be fi nanced by the EIB. If this might help to reach the 
2030 target, it is however important not to forget the fi nal objective of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, which 
has some implications for the investments made before 2030. Th is ‘path dependence’ should rule out substituting 
carbon with gas, which might be good enough for reducing 2030 emissions, but is incompatible with the 2050 
neutrality.    
29 Th e EIB issued on 18 September 2019 bonds with a 15-year maturity worth €3 billion at 0.05 percent.
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• Investing more: Europe’s R&D spending in relation to GDP remains lower than in other 
major economies. In 2015, Europe’s private and public sectors combined spent 2.04 per-
cent of GDP on R&D, compared to 2.07 percent in China, 2.79 percent in the US, 3.29 per-
cent in Japan and 4.2 percent in South Korea ( Eurostat, 2019). Europe will thus not meet 
the target it set itself in 2010 to spend 3 percent of GDP on R&D by 2020. Th e EU business 
enterprise sector in particular needs to invest more. Its share of total R&D expenditure is 
much lower in Europe (64 percent) than in the US (72 percent), or China, Japan and South 
Korea (almost 80 percent) (Eurostat, 2019).
• Investing better: Europe is a global innovation leader in sectors such as automotive and 
biopharma, but is less present in the fast-growing technological, electronics and digital 
sectors that will increasingly underpin clean energy, clean mobility and smart buildings 
solutions. To turn decarbonisation into an industrial opportunity, the EU must push the 
business enterprise sector to scale-up its R&D investment also in these disruptive sectors.
In the framework of the European Green Deal, two existing EU initiatives could be 
enhanced and used to stimulate more R&D investment by the business enterprise sector in 
clean disruptive technologies.
Th e fi rst tool is the European Innovation Council (EIC), currently in pilot phase. Th is is 
inspired by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an agency of the 
US Department of Defense that has signifi cantly contributed towards many technologies, 
including the internet and GPS. DARPA has a rather limited budget of about $3 billion per 
year and focuses on the identifi cation and recruitment of, and provision of support to, top 
innovators. Likewise, the EIC is designed to fi nancially support – through a combination of 
grants and equity – innovators who are developing high-risk, disruptive innovations with 
the potential to create new markets. Th e EIC could become the core innovation tool of the 
European Green Deal, with a strong mandate in the areas of clean energy, clean mobility and 
smart buildings. To enable this, and to make the EIC truly comparable to DARPA, the EIC will 
have to be endowed with at least €15 billion from 2021 to 2027 under Horizon Europe30.
Th e second tool is the Innovation Fund (IF). Established under the EU ETS for the period 
2021-2030, the IF supports the demonstration of low-carbon technologies and processes in 
energy-intensive industries, carbon capture and utilisation and storage of carbon dioxide 
(CCU and CCS), innovative renewable energy and energy storage technologies. Th e IF has 
been endowed with at least 450 million carbon allowances, amounting at current carbon 
price levels to about €11 billion. A sensible way to further scale-up the IF would be to rapidly 
reduce the number of allowances allocated for free under the ETS, and to use the resulting 
revenues for the IF.
In general terms, it must be emphasised that fostering disruptive innovation will require 
a signifi cant dose of risk-taking and an acceptance that there will be failures. New support 
models that provide numerous and still sizeable grants in a relatively non-bureaucratic way 
are crucial to enable disruptive ideas to emerge. Accepting that a signifi cant proportion of 
these ideas will fail is better than putting money on safe but non-disruptive bets31. As Rodrik 
(2014) put it “failure is part and parcel of a successful industrial policy eff ort”32.
30 Horizon Europe is the EU’s research and innovation framework programme for the period 2021-2027. Th e Europe-
an Commission proposed to endow it with a budget of €100 billion, while the European Parliament has proposed 
€120 billion. Of the eventual budget, 35 percent is due to be earmarked for climate-related research.
31 Th e European Research Council is a good example of the value of risk-taking, as so far it has funded seven Nobel 
Prize laureates. 
32 Rodrik also recalls an anecdote about Th omas Watson, the founder of IBM, who supposedly advised cautious 
managers that: “if you want to succeed, raise your error rate”.
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Circle 2: Create the conditions for innovative European companies to 
fl ourish in a receptive market
Public funding for disruptive technological innovation does not by itself guarantee industrial 
development. Th e success of DARPA strongly relates to the overall US economic ecosystem, 
which strongly favours innovation, and to its ability to turn disruptive innovations into mar-
ketable products. DARPA’s limited budget shows that creating the conditions for making inno-
vative products marketable can be more important than public funding for innovation itself. 
Th e EU has three main tools to create the conditions for innovative, green, European com-
panies to fl ourish in a receptive market.
Th e fi rst, more general, tool is the completion of the EU internal market. Fragmentation 
in environmental standards, energy taxation and support measures for clean technologies 
prevent innovative European cleantech companies from scaling up in the way that their US 
and Chinese competitors do on their domestic markets. It is vital to develop a solid regula-
tory framework, focused on ensuring competition and access to a truly single market, with 
common environmental standards. To do this, national industrial policies need to be coordi-
nated – otherwise they create distortions that lead to further fragmentation of the EU single 
market. As Altomonte and Veugelers (2019) put it: “failing to coordinate would hamper the full 
exploitation of the size of the EU market and the related economies of scale”.
Th e second, more specifi c, tool is public procurement. In the EU, this is estimated to 
amount to about 16 percent of GDP (European Commission, 2018). Given its scale, public 
procurement represents a unique tool to foster innovation. For example, requiring clean 
mobility solutions in public procurement tenders could provide a solid boost to the demand 
for electric cars and buses, helping transform the European automotive industry. To become 
the global leader in electric cars, China did not focus on public funding for innovation, but 
rather on creating demand for them through supportive government policy, including public 
procurement programmes (Fredriksson et al, 2018).
Th e third tool is carbon-based contracts for diff erence, which could be a technology-neu-
tral support mechanism for the deployment of low-carbon technologies. As in the renewables 
sector with auctioned feed-in premiums, industrial producers of carbon-intensive products 
would obtain a public subsidy for each unit sold. For example, a steel producer that only 
needs 0.5 tonnes of CO2 to produce one tonne of steel (compare to a benchmark of 1.5 tonnes 
of CO2/tonne of steel), and that managed to secure a carbon price of €50 per tonne through 
the system of carbon-based contracts for diff erence, would receive €25 for each tonne of its 
low carbon steel when the EU ETS price is at €25. Th ese contracts for diff erence can be auc-
tioned to ensure competition between companies for the most effi  cient technologies.
Th ese three complementary tools can foster the emergence of the necessary ecosystem 
that will enable innovative green European companies to grow in a receptive market.
Circle 3: Export the European Green Deal
Th e EU produces less than 10 percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions. Th is implies that to 
have an impact on global temperature levels, the EU needs to push the European Green Deal 
beyond its borders. To do so, a two-step strategy is needed.
Th e fi rst step would be the rapid establishment of the Neighbourhood, Development and 
International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), which has been proposed by the European 
Commission as part of the EU’s 2021-2027 budget discussions (ongoing at time of writing). 
NDICI would bring together EU funding for its external policies in a single instrument. Th e 
Commission has proposed a budget of €89.2 billion for the NDICI for 2021-2027, while the 
European Parliament has called for a budget of €93 billion. A quarter of the NDICI budget 
would be earmarked for climate action – about €3 billion/year over the period. NDICI should 
be put in place quickly because the sooner it is in place, the sooner the EU can increase its 
visibility and leverage in developing countries, while pooling existing resources would favour 
internal effi  ciency and – most importantly – impact in the fi eld (Tagliapietra, 2017a). Mean-
while, the climate component of NDICI should be scaled-up, to reach, say, a minimum of €5 
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billion/year. A higher amount would give NDICI more leverage to stimulate recipient coun-
tries to implement the energy-market reforms that are necessary to attract international (and 
thus also European) private investors.
Th e second step would be to further consolidate and streamline EU development fi nance 
and climate activities outside Europe, which are today divided between the European Com-
mission, the EIB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and EU 
countries. Streamlining could be done by creating a single entity such as a European Climate 
and Sustainable Development Bank, as proposed by Council of the European Union (2019), 
which strongly made the case for fi xing the current system of European multilateral fi nance, 
which is characterised by overlaps, gaps and ineffi  ciencies. Council of the European Union 
(2019) outlined three options for creating a European Climate and Sustainable Development 
Bank: i) building on the EBRD and the external fi nancing activities of the EIB; ii) creating a 
new, well-capitalised, institution with mixed ownership (including the European Commis-
sion, EIB, EBRD, EU countries and others); iii) creating it as an EIB subsidiary. Together with 
NDICI, a European Climate and Sustainable Development Bank could become a key tool to 
export the European Green Deal.
Such an approach would represent a triple win for the EU. First, it would help meet the 
EU’s climate fi nance obligations and thus help to achieve the ‘conditional’ emission-re-
duction commitments assumed by most developing countries under the Paris Agreement. 
Second, it would enable EU industry to enter into new, rapidly growing, markets. And third, 
it would help economic development in the EU’s partner countries, providing an invaluable 
foreign policy dividend for the EU.
5 How to make the transition inclusive and 
just
Climate policies including emissions standards for cars, renewables support fi nanced 
through levies on households’ electricity consumption and carbon pricing for heating fuels 
disproportionately aff ect poor households, and might thus lead to an increase in inequality 
(Zachmann et al, 2018).
Th e impact will be particularly signifi cant for the lowest deciles of the income scale, for 
those in rural and suburban areas (who will be aff ected by the rise in fuel prices) and for 
regions that are particularly dependent on the production of fossil fuels, such as coal, and will 
thus be aff ected by the disappearance of some industries and jobs. Th is means that some seg-
ments of the population and some regions particularly aff ected by the transition will require 
special assistance.
However, while climate policies can have adverse distributional consequences, inaction 
cannot be the answer. Not acting would make everybody worse off , ultimately with a greater 
negative aff ect on low-income households compared to high-income households. Th ere is 
hence no trade-off  between climate and equity. 
From a political perspective, what makes the situation more diffi  cult is that the gains from 
climate policies will mostly be invisible if these policies succeed and disaster is avoided, while 
the costs of climate policies are immediate and tangible, especially for the most vulnerable 
population groups.
To avoid a dangerous backlash against climate policies (such as the reaction that was 
at the root of the gilets jaunes movement, which led the French government to abandon an 
expected carbon tax increase), the question is therefore how climate policies and compensa-
tion schemes should be designed to counterbalance these adverse distributional eff ects.
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Designing less-regressive climate policies
Th e fi rst solution is to prioritise less-regressive policies and focus on less-regressive sectors 
fi rst. Climate policies for diff erent products/services have diff erent distributional impacts. In 
order to reduce the regressive eff ects, climate policymakers might prioritise the least-regres-
sive elements. For example, putting high prices on carbon in transport, and in particular on 
aviation, will have less dramatic distributional consequences than a similar price for heating 
or electricity. 
Policymakers should also focus on less-regressive policy tools. Diff erent instruments can 
be used to decarbonise a sector and some policy instruments are more regressive than others. 
Policy choices should therefore be concerned not only by eff ectiveness and effi  ciency consid-
erations, but should also take distributional aspects into account. In the discussion on taxes 
versus technology standards, distributional concerns provide an additional argument for the 
former. 
Most importantly, policy design should seek to minimise regressive eff ects. For example, 
giving free allowances to companies whose face-value is priced in for consumers is an unnec-
essarily regressive instrument.
Correcting regressive climate policies through compensation
Policies dealing with the social consequences of the transition and ensuring that no one is left 
behind will take two complementary forms. 
First it will be important to use the revenues from climate policies (and in particular the 
increased revenues resulting from a more comprehensive carbon pricing system, as discussed 
in section 2) to compensate the citizens most aff ected by the rise in carbon prices.
To do this, money raised from taxing emissions could be returned to citizens in the form 
of a so-called dividend33. Th is could take the form of lump sum transfers like in Switzerland, 
where two thirds of the revenues from carbon levies go back to the population through this 
means34. Money can also be targeted at the lower deciles of the income distribution. Th is is 
the case, for example, in British Columbia in Canada, where revenues from the carbon tax 
have been used to reduce taxes for the lowest paid, plus provide an additional transfer condi-
tional on low income levels.
In the light of the fi asco of the increase in the French carbon tax in 2017-18, which resulted 
(in combination with a large increase in oil prices) in the emergence of the gilets jaunes 
movement, Bureau et al (2019) made a detailed proposal for France that could be used as a 
blueprint in many EU countries. Th ey proposed to redistribute fully the French carbon tax 
revenues, through transfers based on income and geographical criteria, targeting the most 
aff ected locations such as rural and small urban areas with limited access to public transport. 
Using this combination of criteria would minimise the number of people negatively aff ected 
by the rise in carbon prices – in the French case such a system of transfers would compensate 
fully the six lowest deciles of the income distribution.
From a political perspective, it appears that well-designed compensation mechanisms are 
crucial if the population is to accept climate policies. Th is is what the Swiss, Canadian and 
French (in a negati ve way) examples suggest. What should the European Commission do on 
that front? Given that most of the revenues from the ETS and from national carbon taxes go 
directly to member states, the EU cannot directly put in place such a compensation scheme. 
However, as part of the European Green Deal, the Commission should at least raise aware-
ness about this issue among EU countries, encourage them to share best practices and even 
33 It is true that tax revenues are generally fungible in the overall budget, but some mechanisms should be put in 
place to ensure transparency of the level of revenues generated by the carbon tax, so that governments can show 
that they use the revenues to compensate those most aff ected by the tax.
34 Another interesting policy put in place in Switzerland is the mechanism by which the carbon price increases auto-
matically if emission targets are not met, but price rises are postponed if they targets are exceeded. Th is provides 
citizens with an incentive to control their emissions, as noted by Bureau et al (2019).
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make recommendations in the context of the European Semester for such schemes that could 
be put in place at national level.
Second, given that the reallocation of capital resulting from the fi ght against climate 
change will also result in a reallocation of employment, it is crucial to put in place policies to 
facilitate the transition towards new jobs for those whose jobs are at risk. Even if overall the 
net eff ect on employment is neutral or even slightly positive, the transition will make some 
jobs disappear, while creating new ones35.
Th e transitional issue related to climate change is not very diff erent to the challenges from 
globalisation or technological change, so the solution could be the same: if a change in the 
demand for skills is rapid, there is a role for authorities to play to ensure that the workforce 
(and in particular displaced workers with low skills) can be retrained successfully and quickly. 
It is thus crucial to invest heavily in human capital: adult education, re-training, and poli-
cies to improve the labour mobility of older workers, to avoid a high level of unemployment in 
some particularly aff ected regions.
At the EU level, Claeys and Sapir (2018) and Tagliapietra (2017) proposed broadening the 
scope of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund so it can also fi nance active labour 
market policies to help workers who have lost their jobs as a result of the implementation of 
EU climate policies.
Managing the transition in coal and energy-intensive regions
Over the last few years it has become evident that supporting coal and energy-intensive 
regions is of vital importance to ensure the social viability and political feasibility of the 
transition to climate neutrality. Countries strongly reliant on coal keep using employment as 
an argument to delay the necessary transformation. But this argument is hollow, because coal 
jobs in Europe no longer represent a sizable issue, either at national or regional level. 
Production of coal in the EU has been decreasing since 1990. Alves Dias et al (2018) 
estimated that by 2030 the closure of coal mines and coal-fi red power plants across the EU 
could lead to a loss of 160,000 jobs (or 0.06 percent of the current EU workforce). It should 
also be noted that 109,000 of these jobs are already considered at high risk, because of a lack 
of competitiveness. 
While coal jobs are objectively not substantial from EU or national perspectives, their 
loss could have a substantial impact from a regional perspective. By 2030 several regions are 
expected to be particularly hard hit by the transition: one region in Poland could lose up to 
41,000 jobs, and a further three (in the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria) could each 
lose more than 10,000 jobs (Alves Dias et al, 2018).
Given the limited and regional nature of this challenge, the EU could well provide a solu-
tion for the coal jobs that will be lost in the transition. Off ering such a solution would be bene-
fi cial in terms of: i) refocusing the coal transition debate on the only area it should belong to 
– energy policy; ii) providing an incentive to coal-reliant countries to implement or accelerate 
coal phase-out plans. 
Th e EU should propose to member countries a speedy coal phase-out and should con-
currently put in place a scheme, such as the Just Transition Fund proposed by von der Leyen 
(2019), to support workers who would face losing their jobs. Th is would refl ect what it is 
35  Sectors in which jobs could be lost include power generation using fossil fuels (including coal mines, fossil-fu-
el power plants an refi neries), energy-intensive manufacturing, transport, the equipment sector for fossil-fuel 
technologies and retail sales of fossil fuels (eg gas stations). In principle these job losses will be compensated for 
by new jobs in sectors including renewable energy installation, maintenance and operation, and construction 
(because of the need to renovate the building stock). Th e renewable energy sector should create more domestic 
jobs than the fossil-fuel energy sector (see Zachmann et al, 2018).
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already being done in the United States36, and what was done in Europe during the coal-min-
ing transformation of the 1950s37.
In 2017, the European Parliament proposed the creation of a Just Transition Fund, which 
would use 2 percent of the revenues from the auctioning of emission allowances to support 
regions with a high share of workers in carbon-dependent sectors and where per capita GDP 
is well below the EU average. Th is proposal was rapidly dismissed, however, notably because 
of opposition from the European Commission. In 2018, the European Parliament put forward 
a new proposal to establish a Just Transition Fund, this time in the context of the MFF negoti-
ations, and with a proposed endowment of €4.8 billion for 2021-2027.
But the EU does not need to establish a new Just Transition Fund to support the transition 
in coal-mining regions. It only needs to make a better use of the existing European Globali-
sation Adjustment Fund (EGF), which was established in 2006 and has a maximum annual 
budget of €150 million for 2014-2020 – a budget that has so far not been fully employed, with 
on average €40 million disbursed from the EGF each year.
Th e EGF supports workers who lose their jobs because of major structural changes in 
world trade patterns arising from globalisation. It can be triggered when more than 500 work-
ers are made redundant by a single company, or if a large number of workers are laid off  in a 
particular sector in one or more neighbouring regions. Th e EGF provides up to 60 percent of 
the funding for projects, lasting up to two years, to help workers who have been made redun-
dant fi nd new employment or set up their own businesses. EU countries apply for fi nance 
from the EGF and national or regional authorities oversee the deployment of project funds.
Th e EGF has been transformed over time. In 2009, its scope was broadened to cover also 
people losing their jobs as a result of the global fi nancial and economic crisis. In 2014, the 
categories of workers eligible for support were broadened to include young people not in 
employment, education or training (NEETs). In short, the EGF has been adapted to new eco-
nomic and social challenges emerging in Europe. Th e EGF should now be extended to people 
losing their jobs in coal-mining regions as a result of the decarbonisation process38.
Th is can be done quickly by amending the regulation governing the EGF, as was done in 
2009 in response to the negative impact on employment of the global fi nancial and economic 
crisis. Th e amendment could increase the use of the currently under-utilised EGF ( Claeys and 
Sapir, 2018). Th e amendment should:
• Broaden the scope of the EGF, to include support for EU coal-mining regions that commit 
to a timely coal phase-out;
• Modify the redundancies requirements, to allow the EGF to be used not only once workers 
lose their jobs, but also before this happens. Th is would allow the planning of an orderly 
transition, limiting the socio-economic eff ects of the coal phase-out in these regions;
• Extend the implementation period from 24 to 36 months, to allow for proper implementa-
tion in complex cases, such as the closure of coal mines.
36 Th e concept of a ‘just transition’ was developed by North American unions in the 1990s, with a focus on support 
for workers who lost their jobs as a result of environmental protection policies. Examples of US federal just transi-
tion initiatives include President Obama’s Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalisa-
tion and President Trump’s Assistance to Coal Communities programme.
37 Europe’s 1950s transition mechanism for coal-mining regions was the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) Fund for the Retraining and Resettlement of Workers. With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, this fund was trans-
formed into the European Social Fund, which in its early stages was used to support workers who lost their jobs in 
sectors that were modernising, such as coal mining.
38 In 2017, a fi rst coal-related project was fi nanced by the EGF, to support the Spanish coal-mining region of Castilla 
y León. Spain applied for a €1 million to help redundant coal miners and young NEETs in the region fi nd new 
jobs, following the dismissal of 339 coal workers in fi ve coal mines. In order to be eligible, Spain had to establish a 
link between the redundancies and major structural changes in world trade patterns resulting from globalisation. 
Spain successfully argued that the European coal industry is increasingly suff ering from competition from cheaper 
coal from non-European countries.
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Under the 2021-2027 EU budget, the focus of the EGF on coal-mining regions could be 
further strengthened, transforming it into a European Globalisation and Climate Adjustment 
Fund (EGCF).
In order to ensure coal mining is phased out across the EU by the end of the 2021-2027 
EU budget cycle, the EGCF would need to be endowed with adequate fi nancial resources, 
with additional resources taken from the European Social Fund. Th e ‘coal-item’ in the EGCF 
budget for 2021-2027 should be €150 million per year, a total of €1 billion over the period 
(Tagliapietra, 2017). 
By mobilising about 0.1 percent of its total budget, the EU could thus provide a signifi cant 
incentive to coal-reliant EU countries to complete the coal phase-out, generating substantial 
benefi ts in terms of climate, environment and human health. Doing so on the basis of the 
existing EGF could speed up the overall process by avoiding the bureaucratic hurdles related 
to a new institutional set-up.
6 Concluding remarks
Th e recipe for the success of the European Green Deal is as simple as it is breath-taking: to 
intelligently promote deep decarbonisation by accompanying the economic and industrial 
transformation this necessarily implies, and by ensuring the social inclusiveness of the overall 
process.
Should the strategy succeed, the European Green Deal might become a blueprint for other 
countries and a tangible example that pursuing climate neutrality is technically feasible and 
economically and politically viable.
To be clear, this will not be an easy ride. As in any revolution, there will be winners and 
losers. What a European Green Deal should do is provide a clear sense of direction to citizens 
and companies, and put in place mechanisms to ensure that the most vulnerable segments of 
society are supported and not left behind.
But to be politically sustainable, policymakers must be honest about the nature of the 
European Green Deal.
Th e European Green Deal does not need to redefi ne EU economics. All it needs to do is 
to shift our economy from fossil fuels to zero-carbon in a way that’s socially and politically 
viable.
Th e European Green Deal should thus not be promoted as a powerful economic bazooka, 
but rather as an effi  cient reallocation mechanism, fostering investment shifts and labour 
substitution in key economic sectors, while helping the most vulnerable segments of society 
throughout the process. In practise, this means promoting a shift from fossil fuels to renew-
ables, turning combustion-engine car jobs into electric car jobs, compensating low-income 
households for higher fuel prices and re-training coal miners to get new jobs.
Th is is how President designate von der Leyen should present the European Green Deal to 
make it socio-economically successful and politically sustainable.
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